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Proposed Guidelines for Measuring the
Propriety of Armed State Responses to
Terrorist Attacks
By SAGE R. KNAUFT:
I. Introduction
In early March 1996, former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres
proclaimed that Israel is at war with the militant Islamic movement
Hamas and will use all means to destroy it.1 This statement came after
his country had suffered its third terrorist bombing in a week.- Such a
declaration by a world leader may at first seem strange because the
notion of going to war against terrorists is foreign to traditional think-
ing on the subject. When one considers Israel's history of mounting
counterterror commando raids,3 aircraft interceptions,4 and other
forms of self-defense and reprisals against suspected terrorists, the
use of armed force to combat terrorism suddenly becomes a credible
option.
The debate over the use of force in combatting transnational ter-
rorism6 is ongoing. It has been the subject of a considerable amount
of scholarly inquiry,7 United Nations debate, and international disa-
greement since Israel began to use military force to respond to terror-
* Member of the Class of 1997. B.A. University of California. Santa Barbara, 1934.
I would like to thank my family for their undying support, encouragement, and lo% e
1. Mary Curtius, Peres Vows to Ruin Hamas; Israel Declares Rar N':v Bs Bumbmin
Kills 19, Fuels Rage, L.A. Trmms, Mar. 4, 1996. at Al.
2. Id.
3. Caryle Murphy, Israeli Raid Kills Hezbollal Leader, Attac: Called 'Mcssage' to
Terrorists, VAsH. PosT, Feb. 17, 1992, at Al.
4. Antonio Cassese, The International Communit,'s "Legal' Rcsponse to Tcrrorism,
38 INT'L & Coap. L.Q. 5S9. 601 (19S9).
5. See William O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Cozmtrrrroerfr Op-
erations, 30 VA. J. INTL L. 421 (1990).
6. For a definition of "transnational terrorism" see infra part II.A.
7. For a good collection of scholarly work on the subject, ee Robert J. Beck &
Anthony C. Arend, "Don't Tread on us'" International Law and Forcible State Rcsponscs to
Terrorism, 12 Wis. Irr'L LJ. 153, 193-213 (1994).
8. Id at 169-73.
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ist attacks against its citizens both at home and abroad.' The
international consensus has been largely critical of the practice, with
the Security Council condemning most of Israel's counterterror opera-
tions as impermissible under international law.' 0 Israel has managed
to forward a justification for such actions, however, as permissible
self-defense under the United Nations Charter,"1 a position that has
been gaining acceptance among scholars.12 Moreover, after the 1986
raid on Libya,'3 and the 1993 cruise missile attack on Baghdad, 4 one
could certainly argue that the United States has accepted the position
that a state may legitimately use force to defend itself against transna-
tional terrorism.
This Note posits that there is justification for the use of force to
combat transnational terrorism in certain limited circumstances. Part
II will define transnational terrorism and analyze existing interna-
tional and non-forcible state responses to the problem, concluding
that these responses are inadequate. Part III will seek to justify the
use of force as "self-defense" under international law with the goal of
creating guidelines by which to measure forcible counterterror opera-
tions. Part IV will analyze Israeli and United States counterterror op-
erations under these guidelines, testing their propriety with a number
of factors. Finally, Part V will conclude that the deterrent effect of
such actions is justification for their use in an age of increasing terror-
ist threat.
H. Transnational Terrorism and the Inadequacy of
Existing Law
A. Towards a Workable Definition
One of the first problems that one encounters in studying state
responses to terrorism is reaching an acceptable definition of the term.
Indeed, as one scholar has noted, "no single inclusive definition of
international terrorism has been accepted by the United Nations or in
9. See O'Brien, supra note 5, at 421.
10. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 27th Sess., 1644th mtg. at 11-20, U.N. Doc. SIINF/28 (1972)
(Security Council resolution condemning Israeli military actions against Lebanon).
11. See O'Brien, supra note 5, at 433-35.
12. See Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 213.
13. See George J. Church, Hitting the Source; U.S. Bombers Strike at Libya's Author of
Terrorism, Dividing Europe and Threatening a Rash of Retaliations, TimE, Apr. 28, 1986, at
16.
14. See Eric Schmitt, U.S. Says Strike Crippled Iraq's Capacity for Terror, N.Y. TINIES,
June 28, 1993, at A6.
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a generally accepted multilateral treaty.""5 Still, many definitions
have been forwarded by scholars, and from these it is possible to ar-
rive at a working definition of transnational terrorism that will suffice
for the purpose of analysis. The three elements that are key to the
definition are: (1) the definition of an act of terrorism, (2) the defini-
tion of transnational, and (3) the level of state support for these acts.
First, a "terrorist act" is usually characterized by three elements:
1. Violence, whether actual or threatened;
2. A "political" objective, however conceived; and
3. An intended audience, typically, though not exclusively, a
wide one.
16
For example, one scholar defines terrorism as "the threat or use
of violence, with the intent of causing fear among the public, in order
to achieve political objectives.'1 7 The State Department defines ter-
rorism as "the threat of violence for political purposes by individuals
or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to, established govern-
mental authority, when such actions are intended to influence a target
group wider than the immediate victim or victims."',' Thus, the terror-
ist seeks to bring attention to political goals by using violence against
a target group. However, this definition does not distinguish between
the domestic terrorist act and the transnational terrorist act.
The second part of the definition must define the transnational
aspect of the terrorist act. Again, there is a variety of opinions on how
to distinguish the transnational terrorist. he prevailing view is that
transnational terrorists are distinguished by the fact that their violent
acts cross national boundaries. As one scholar notes, "The hallmark
of modern transnational terrorism is the 'active' use of violence in
states not 'directly' involved in the conflict that results in 'innocent'
persons becoming victims for 'political' ends."'2
When this element of territoriality is isolated from the definition,
it is possible to distinguish a domestic act of terrorism such as the
15. Oscar Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11
Hous. J. INT'L L. 309, 309 (19S9).
16. Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 162.
17. Gregory F. Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya. An lnternational Legal Analysts,
19 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 177, 177 n.ll (19S7).
18. OFFICE OF CONMATTING TERRORISM, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, PattErns of Interna-
tional Terrorism: 1982 (1983).
19. See RRI Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 ARO-4 L REv.
380 (1974).
20. See Bradley Larschan, Legal Aspects to the Control of Transnational Terrorism: An
Overview, 13 OHio N.U. L. REv. 117, 124 (1986) (emphasis added).
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bombing in Oklahoma City2 from the transnational act of terrorism
such as the recent suicide bombings by Hamas in Israel.22 The domes-
tic act of terrorism may be equally or more damaging than the trans-
national act, but the proper recourse for a state in dealing with
domestic terrorism is its own criminal justice system.23 For the pur-
pose of this Note, the domestic acts occurring entirely within the bor-
ders of a state will, except for the extent to which these acts were
influenced by foreign states,2 4 be excluded from the analysis.
A third element useful in determining whether forcible
counterterror operations may be used is the level of state involvement
in the act of terrorism.25 As Beck and Arend note: "Inevitably, all
[terrorist activities] have some state association, for terrorist actors
must act within a system of sovereign states and virtually always have
bases within states. The agents of terrorism differ, however, in the
degree to which they are tolerated, supported or sponsored by
states. ' 26 At this stage of the analysis where we are seeking a general
definition, it is sufficient to note that when the level of state support
for transnational terrorists is high, the chances of bringing the perpe-
trators to justice through non-forcible means is lOW.2 7 Conversely, the
justification for using forcible counterterror measures is higher.28
Therefore, for the purposes of this Note, "transnational terror-
ism" is defined as "the threat or use of violence with the intent of
causing fear in a target group, in order to achieve political objec-
tives,"'29 from forces outside a state's jurisdiction with at least a mini-
mum level of foreign state support or toleration.
21. See Mark D.W. Edington, Terror in the Heartland: Bombing in Oklahoma City,
SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Apr. 23, 1995, at G1.
22. Curtius, supra note 1, at Al.
23. This can also be said of the foreign terrorist who strikes inside a state's borders
because, presumably, such an attack will constitute a violation of that state's criminal law.
24. See infra part III.A.2.
25. See Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 163.
26. Id.
27. For example, it will be very difficult to extradite a suspected terrorist from a state
that strongly supports his political goals. See, e.g., Robert Alfert, Jr., Hostes Humani
Generis: An Expanded Notion of U.S. Counterterrorist Legislation, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
171, 187 (1992); see also infra part II.C.1.
28. See Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 218-19.
29. Id. at 163 (emphasis omitted).
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B. Transnational Terrorist Acts Are Becoming More Prevalent
As one scholar has noted, "Transnational terrorism may well be
the greatest threat to world peace today.":30 While this is probably an
overstatement, it is painfully clear that terrorist organizations are be-
coming more organized, 3 technologically advanced,3 2 and arguably
more ruthless.33 Another scholar laments that "terrorist groups have
reached a level of sophistication never before encountered, thereby
making some terrorist incidents difficult to counteract."31
Some of the current research indicates that terrorists are using
more sophisticated weapons that are capable of escaping detection3 5
and are organizing themselves into transnational networks capable of
instigating terrorist attacks almost anywhere in the world.2'- More-
over, it appears that the level of state support for such acts is on the
rise, 7 with the United States charging "that in 1983 alone there were
at least 70 transnational terrorist attacks [that] involved significant
state support or participation.
' '3 8
The prospects for the future do not seem to be any better. As
Alfert so pointedly notes, "The ensuing decade is already marred by
predictions that terrorists will employ instruments of mass destruction
such as chemical, biological, or perhaps even nuclear weapons."39 In
addition, as various economies are ever more linked in transnational
business, those organizations that seek to disrupt through violence will
be presented with an even greater array of potential targets.4  As
transnational terrorists become more sophisticated and dangerous, the
world must be ready to take extraordinary measures, including forci-
ble self-defense, to counter this threat.
30. Larschan, supra note 20, at 117-18.
31. See Alfert, supra note 27, at 172 nn.3-4.
32. See Larschan, supra note 20, at 118-19.
33. Id.
34. See Alfert, supra note 27, at 172 n.4.
35. Id-
36. Id. at 172 n.3.
37. See Larschan, supra note 20, at 121.
38. Id. at 126-27.
39. Alfert, supra note 27, at 175.
40. See Adam W. Wegner, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under International Law:
The Yunis Decision as a Model for the Prosecution of Terrorists in U.S. Courts, 22 L' &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 409, 412-13 (1991).
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C. The Failure of Non-Forcible Methods to Deter Terrorism
Next, it is important to analyze the existing international legal
responses and non-forcible state responses. The use of force as a de-
terrent should only be undertaken as a last resort. As Beck and
Arend note, "It is ... essential to bear in mind that force is only one
possible response, the most coercive response to terrorism."' 41 This
section will look first to international legal responses and then to uni-
lateral non-forcible responses to transnational terrorism. It concludes
that neither of these responses are an adequate deterrent.
1. International Efforts to Control and Punish Transnational
Terrorists
a. International Conventions and Treaties
Due to a lack of consensus on how to define terrorism, 42 the
world community has been slow to develop methods to prevent and
punish transnational terrorist acts.43 To date "no comprehensive
treaty covering all varieties of terrorist activity has been able to garner
global acceptance."'44 As a result, the world community has turned to
"specific treaties"'45 that prohibit certain terrorist acts such as hi-
jacking.46 The Hague Convention establishes hijacking a civilian air-
craft as an international crime.47 The Convention calls on its members
to either extradite or prosecute the alleged hijackers when they are
captured.48
This type of cooperative treaty, designed to provide "near-univer-
sal jurisdiction" over particular terrorist acts,49 is a positive develop-
ment because it serves notice to transnational terrorists that there is
no "safe harbor" when they commit crimes in international airspace.
The Hague Convention has been followed by a series of other interna-
41. Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 173.
42. See Liam G.B. Murphy, Esq., A Proposal on International Legal Responses to Ter-
rorism, 2 ToURO J. TRANSNAT'L L. 67, 80-95 (1991).
43. See Douglas Kash, Abductions of Terrorists in International Airspace and on the
High Seas, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 65, 73 (1993).
44. See Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 169. In 1937, there was such a treaty under the
League of Nations, but this treaty has been allowed to lapse and is no longer in force. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,1970,
10 I.L.M. 133 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
47. Id.
48. Id. art. 7 at 134-35.
49. See Kash, supra note 43, at 74 (citation omitted).
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tional agreements prohibiting certain terrorist acts such as piracy, air-
craft sabotage, and hostage taking.-"
While these conventions are a valuable step towards international
cooperation in the prevention and punishment of terrorism, they suf-
fer from a number of fatal flaws. First, the coverage of these conven-
tions is by definition limited to the specific acts that are prohibited.-"
This leaves a host of potential crimes such as suicide bombing that
could potentially go unpunished. Second, these treaties are limited to
acts of terrorism that occur in international airspace or in interna-
tional waters,5 2 leaving the acts of transnational terrorism that occur
within a state's borders completely immune from the purview of inter-
national law.
A final obstacle impeding the effectiveness of these conventions
is the "political offense exception" to forced extradition.-3
The "political offense exception" permits the State of capture to re-
fuse to extradite a suspect, despite the allegation of an extraditable
crime, if the State of capture concludes that the crime alleged was
committed either with a valid political purpose or that the suspect
would be subject to political persecution upon return to the request-
ing State.54
Thus, the state of capture is permitted to suppress the extradition and
provide the terrorist with a safe harbor from prosecution. As this ex-
ception makes apparent, the international conventions dealing with
transnational terrorism are inadequate and serve no credible deter-
rent effect.
b. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Another legal principle that has often been used to combat trans-
national terrorism is extraterritorial jurisdiction. Under this theory, a
state may have the right to assert "jurisdiction over certain acts of
terrorism committed anywhere in the world."5-- Two theories are
often advanced to support this notion. The "universality" principle is
based on the belief that terrorist acts are crimes against humanity and
50. See eg., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 19SS, 27 I.L.M. 665; Convention for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 10 LLAM, 1151; Interna-
tional Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 4. 1979, 18 I.L M, 46.
51. See Hague Convention, supra note 46, 10 I.LM. at 133.
52. Id.
53. See Murphy, supra note 42, at 75.
54. Id. at 76.
55. Wegner, supra note 40, at 416.
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therefore any state has a right to prosecute an offender on behalf of
the world.56 The "passive personal" principle allows a state to assert
jurisdiction over an offender for an offense committed against that
state's nationals anywhere in the world.
57
At least one U.S. court has held that extraterritorial jurisdiction
may be applied to arrest a suspected terrorist in international bounda-
ries in order to try him in the United States.58 This principle, scholars
argue, is a valuable method to prosecute terrorists because it allows
for jurisdiction to extend beyond a victim state's borders. 59 The the-
ory is that if a terrorist can be found, he may be punished.
The United States Congress has similarly embraced the doctrine
of extraterritorial jurisdiction as evidenced by the Omnibus Diplo-
matic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.60 This legislation seeks
to close the loophole that exists in the exercise of extraterritorial juris-
diction by "authoriz[ing] U.S. courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over a terrorist guilty of injuring or murdering U.S. citizens overseas
through the use of nonconvention violence such as bombings or shoot-
ings.' Thus, Congress explicitly extended the coverage of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction to all acts of terrorist violence, instead of only those
crimes covered by an international convention.
Despite the promise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, several defi-
ciencies must be noted. Alfert points out that the political offense
exception is a major obstacle because, as noted above, a state may
block extradition by calling terrorist acts "political."62 Further, the
doctrine can only be invoked when a suspected terrorist is captured in
international territory, leaving little practical need for its exercise.
The doctrine of extraterritorial jurisdiction, despite its limited suc-
cess, 63 does not provide the necessary deterrent to thwart terrorism.
56. See Alfert, supra note 27, at 181-82.
57. See Wegner, supra note 40, at 427.
58. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988), affd, 924 F.2d 1086
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
59. See Wegner, supra note 40, at 438-40.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988).
61. Alfert, supra note 27, at 191 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 192.
63. For example, Yunis was a successful use of extraterritorial jurisdiction to bring an
international hijacker to justice. See Yunis, supra note 58.
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2. Non-Forcible Unilateral Responses Are Similarly Izeffective
Deterrents
Scholars opposed to the use of force in counterterror operations
have noted that a state has a host of non-forcible responses available.
Professor Murphy has noted that these options include quiet diplo-
macy, public protest, and economic sanctions.6 These non-forcible
responses are similar to an armed response in the unilateral nature of
the action and the fact that both categories rely on the presumption of
state involvement in transnational terrorism. Non-forcible methods
have merit in that the responding state can take the moral "high road"
in dealing with terrorists by responding to violence with measure and
reason. When the response is nonviolent there is no need to measure
its necessity and proportionality.
However, there are inherent limitations in unilateral diplomatic
responses to terrorism. First, a transnational terrorist group may re-
ceive some state support in, for example, invoking the political offense
exception to refuse extradition of suspected terrorists.* But rarely
does a state openly sponsor transnational terrorist groups, fearing that
such sponsorship could be deemed an act of overt state aggression.
Most state inducement arises in the form of toleration where a state
"knows of [the terrorists'] existence and fails to suppress them.''" A
diplomatic response designed to pressure another state is therefore ill-
suited as a deterrent to a subnational entity that is not directly linked
to the target state. Moreover, diplomacy is unlikely to influence peo-
ple who are willing to use violence to call attention to their political
beliefs. Such terrorists have by definition indicated their contempt for
diplomatic problem solving.
In sum, existing international conventions, jurisdictional doc-
trines, and diplomatic unilateral responses do not adequately address
the problem of transnational terrorism. Accordingly, a state may be
forced to turn to forcible counterterror operations to send the
message to terrorists that their actions will not be tolerated under a
rule of law. The next section will argue that forcible responses can be
justified under international law and will propose a set of guidelines
by which such responses may be measured.
64. See JOHN F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTERNAXTIONA\L TEprnonsI.: LEGAL,
POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONs 2 (19S9).
65. See Alfert, supra note 27, at 1S6-S7.
66. See Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 165.
19961
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
m. Forcible State Responses to Transnational Terrorism
A. Justification Under International Law
In advocating the use of forcible state response to transnational
terrorism, it is important to find some justification in existing interna-
tional law. The basic tenet of international law holds that states
should refrain from the use of force to settle disputes.67 Article 2,
paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter reads: "All members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."'  Thus, the analysis of forcible state responses to terrorism
must proceed from the perspective that any use of force is an ex-
traordinary measure that must be justified under the Charter.
It should be noted at the outset that the Security Council has
taken a very restrictive view of forcible responses to terrorism. Mem-
bers of the Council have repeatedly denounced counterterror opera-
tions as reprisals that are illegal under the Charter.69 The Israeli
position,70 and after the 1986 raid on Libya, the United States posi-
tion,71 has been that such responses are permissible "self-defense" tac-
tics justified under international law.72 This section will outline the
Security Council position in opposition to the forcible response to ter-
rorism, analyze the Israeli and United States position that self-defense
is justified, and conclude that certain counterterror operations are jus-
tified under international law.
1. The Security Council's Position
Security Council resolutions concerning forcible state responses
to terrorism have been aimed exclusively at Israel and the United
States. This is the case because "only Israel and the United States
have thus far used force in response to terrorism. Significantly, both
states have been conspicuous victims of terrorist activities and both
67. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
68. ld. art. 2, para. 4.
69. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 27th Sess., 1643d mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. 8/PV.1643 (1972);
U.N. SCOR, 27th Sess., 1644th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1644 (1972) (statements by
French and Guinean representatives condemning the use of forcible reprisals during the
debate over an Israeli counterterror raid).
70. See Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to
Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 25, 38-39 (1987).
71. O'Brien, supra note 5, at 463.
72. Id. at 433-34; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
[Vol. 19:763
Proposed Guidelines for Responses to Terrorist Attacks
have possessed sufficient military and intelligence capacities to under-
take coercive measures."73 Specific examples of Israeli and United
States counterterror operations will be analyzed in Part IV in the con-
text of analyzing their propriety under international law.7
The Security Council has taken the position that a state may not
invoke "self-defensive" force under Article 51 unless it is responding
to an armed attack.75 Further, the view of what constitutes such an
attack is restrictive, in that terrorist acts generally will not rise to the
level of an armed attack because of the lack of direct state involve-
ment.7 6 Further, the Council has taken the position that self-defense
can only occur during or immediately after the armed attack takes
place and then only within the responding state's borders.' Because
many counterterror operations take some time to plan and are aimed
at terrorist bases abroad, they are seen as premeditated reprisals that
exceed the customary level of acceptable self-defense.
78
As O'Brien notes, "The upshot is that the version of self-defense
offered by the Security Council to Israel is one of purely passive de-
fense within Israel's territory. 79 Indeed, the Security Council has re-
peatediy condemned Israeli counterterror operations as impermissible
"reprisals" under international law.3u In sum, the Security Council
has taken an extremely narrow view of the legality of forcible self-
defense under the Charter.
The Council has also used the twin rationales of necessity and
proportionality, first articulated in The Caroline in 1837,1 to argue
that armed responses to terrorist attacks cannot be justified as legiti-
mate exercises of self-defense. In The Caroline, arising out of a
United States-United Kingdom dispute about an armed insurrection
in Canada,s2 the requirements of necessity and proportionality were
73. Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 214.
74. See infra part IV.
75. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter reads in part, "[nothing in this prezent Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defcnce if an armcd attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken meas-
ures necessary to maintain international peace and security." U.N. CtLsnPTR art. 51 gcm-
phasis added).
76. See Baker, supra note 70, at 41-42.
77. See O'Brien, supra note 5, at 471-72.
78. See Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 65 A.1 .1 IYVL
L. 1, 7 (1972).
79. O'Brien, supra note 5, at 472.
80. See Bowett, supra note 78, at 4.
81. See Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 193 n.200.
82. Id.
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established for forcible self-defense.8 3 In his letter to Mr. Fox, the
British Minister at Washington, American Secretary of State Daniel
Webster defined the requirement of "necessity" as a decision that is
"instant, overwhelming, and leav[es] no choice of means, and no mo-
ment of deliberation." 84 He defined "proportionality" as actions that
are "not unreasonable or excessive."8 5
The concepts of necessity and proportionality have been used by
the Security Council at various times to condemn forcible counterter-
ror operations.8 6 The basic argument under these rationales is that
most counterterror operations are premeditated and deliberate,
thereby precluding a finding of necessity.87 Also, these responses are
at times more violent than the terrorism that precedes them, making it
difficult to find them proportionate.88 Under these rationales, the Se-
curity Council has bolstered its argument that armed responses are
illegal under international law.
2. The Israeli and United States Position
Israel has been equally as adamant in its position that forcible
counterterror operations are a necessary element of its "inherent"89
right to self-defense.90 Israel's position is predicated on Article 51,
and has several components that can be summarized as follows:
1. An "armed attack" is a violent terrorist attack committed on
a state's nationals, whether at home or abroad.91
2. A state has the right to use forcible methods to protect itself
or its citizens, particularly because the Security Council has failed
to take measures "necessary in order to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security." 9
83. Id.
84. Al.; see also Brian K. McCalmon, Note, State, Refugees, and Self-Defense, 10 GEO,
IIMIGR. L.J. 215, 228 n.86 (1996).
85. Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 193 n.200.
86. See Bowett, supra note 78, at 7.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
90. See U.N. SCOR, 27th Sess., 1643d mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S110550 (1972) (statement
by Ambassador Doron of Israel justifying a counterterror attack against the PLO in Leba-
non as self-defense).
91. See Baker, supra note 70, at 38.
92. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51; see also U.N. SCOR, 27th Sess., 1649th mtg. at 25, U.N.
Doc. S/10716 (1972). Ambassador Tekoah of Israel commented:
[I]f one examines Security Council resolutions it appears as if... jewish suffering
... [is] of no concern to the Council. It is only when Israel as a last resort strikes
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3. A state may invade the sovereign territory of another state to
defend itself if the other state has violated international custom
by supporting terrorists within its borders.
93
4. Necessity and proportionality must be construed in a broader
sense than in the original definition found in The Caroline be-
cause of the harsh realities of modem transnational terrorism."' -
Thus, the Israelis assert that a state is justified under Article 51 to
defend itself from terrorist attacks by mounting armed counterterror
operations.
In today's political landscape, transnational terrorist acts should
be viewed as "armed attacks" within the meaning of the United Na-
tions Charter. Factors such as the level of state support or assistance
given to the terrorist95 and the number of attacks that a particular
group has mounted against the state9 6 can serve to raise otherwise
"isolated" terrorist attacks to the level of an armed attack. 7 As
Yehuda Blum notes:
Obviously, one would have to treat an isolated terrorist act differ-
ently from an act of terrorism that is but one link in a long chain of
such acts, particularly when it is obvious that so many such acts,
could not have been carried out without the encouragement, knowl-
edge or acquiescence of another state.
9S
Subjective factors such as the level of fear in the population as a result
of the terrorism and the political goals of the states supporting terror-
ist groups should also be considered in determining whether an armed
attack has occurred. 9
A terrorist act should be viewed as an armed attack any time a
state's nationals are threatened or attacked by a terrorist act, whether
at home or abroad in accordance with traditional state claims to the
right to protect its interests around the globe instead of only within its
back in self-defence to repel and avert attacks and protect the lives of its citizns
that the Council seems to awaken to action.
Id.
93. See G.A. Res. 40161, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 301, U.N Dozo At
RES140161 (19S6) (General Assembly resolution on measures to prevent international ter-
rorism which calls upon all states to refrain from organizing terrorist activities) [hereinafter
The Resolution].
94. See Baker, supra note 70, at 34, 47.
95. Id at 38.
96. See Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 216-17.
97. See Baker, supra note 70, at 42.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 42-43.
19961
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
borders. 100 This position was stated by the Legal Advisor to the State
Department as follows:
[W]here an American is attacked because he is an American, in or-
der to punish the U.S. or to coerce the U.S. into accepting a political
position, the attack is one in which the U.S. has a sufficient interest
to justify extending its protection through necessary and propor-
tionate actions. No nation should be limited to using force to protect
its citizens, from attacks on their citizenship, to situations in which
they are within its boundaries.
10
Therefore, in keeping with this traditional view of extending a state's
protection to its citizens anywhere in the world, self-defense should
not be confined to a state's boundaries. "The right of a state to pro-
tect its nationals in a foreign country is an integral part of the right of
self-defense.' 1o2
The second part of the Israeli argument justifying forcible state
responses to terrorism is the failure of the Security Council to main-
tain international peace and security 0 3 When the international com-
munity is incapable of even reaching a common definition of
terrorism,"° ' much less creating effective methods to punish ter-
rorists, 05 there is little wonder that states which often find themselves
the targets of terrorism turn to forcible self-defense. The fact that the
international community has been unable to curb terrorist attacks is
strong support for the right to self-defense.
A further basis for establishing the legality of forcible self-de-
fense is the level of support and assistance given to terrorist groups by
other states. 0 6 The United Nations General Assembly has declared
that states have the obligation to refrain from "organizing," "instigat-
ing," or "assisting" terrorist groups within its borders.'0 7 When a state
fails to undertake this obligation and actively supports terrorists, the
victims of those terrorist attacks are justified in crossing the state's
borders to defend themselves. However, even if a terrorist group is
supported by another state, this does not give rise to a per se right to
100. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in Interna-
tional Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REv. 89, 96 (1989).
101. Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 199 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
102. Baker, supra note 70, at 38.
103. kLd at 27-28.
104. See Wegner, supra note 40, at 410.
105. See Baker, supra note 70, at 26-28.
106. See id. at 36-37.
107. See The Resolution, supra note 93, at 301.
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self-defense. State support can, at the very least, be used to support a
finding that the targeted state was the victim of an armed attack.
Finally, the Israeli argument advocates a more realistic view of
necessity and proportionality to keep pace with the realities of mod-
em transnational terrorism. Given the ongoing nature of many terror-
ist attacks, the circumstances are vastly different than a "singular
incident along the U.S.-Canadian border in 1837."'L Baker argues
that the necessity requirement as applied to states affords a longer
time period betveen attack and response because of the inherent dif-
ference between a state and an individual.1' "'An individual's [defen-
sive] response is normally spontaneous, whereas a state requires a
more calculated response when its 'collective life is threatened."'
11 0
A modem view of necessity should therefore take this factor into
account and should allow for some time lapse between attack and
response. It is unrealistic to hold a state to a standard which re-
quires that "necessity of self-defense" leave "no moment for
deliberation."'1 1
The proportionality requirement is more problematic because of
the perception that an armed response is disproportionate to the at-
tack that precedes it." 2 However, when one considers such factors as
the number of preceding attacks, the probability of future attacks."-
and the level of state support behind the terrorist attack, an armed
response can be proportionate. When it is apparent that a state is
dealing with a state-sponsored group that may be engaging in a series
of attacks against its citizens, an armed response should be seen as a
proportionate defense to terrorist aggression.
Collecting these various arguments together, a convincing case
can be made for the legality of armed counterterror operations.
Under Article 51, a state has the right to defend itself from armed
attack vith necessary and proportionate force. By expanding the defi-
nitions of armed attack, necessity, and proportionality, it is possible to
fit a terrorist attack into this model. There is no debate that if a mili-
tary attack were to be launched against one state by another state, it
would be entitled to forcible self-defense. Logic dictates that an
108. See O'Brien, supra note 5, at 471.
109. See Baker, supra note 70, at 34.
110. Id.
111. 1& at 32 (citing the necessity requirement from The Caroline. See Beck & Arend,
supra note 7, at 193 n.200).
112. ld. at 47.
113. Id.
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armed attack which originates from transnational terrorists should be
treated the same way, especially when the terrorists are supported by
another state. Therefore, forcible state responses to terrorism should
be justified as self-defense.
B. Proposed Guidelines to Measure Forcible Self-Defense
As Beck and Arend note, "Terrorist acts vary dramatically in
their scope and character. Accordingly, it is virtually impossible... to
devise a legal scheme that specifically identifies every possible terror-
ist armed attack. 11 4 However, it is possible to construct a framework
that incorporates the right of self-defense with the requirements of
necessity and proportionality.
The proposed guidelines that follow are designed to form a
checklist by which forcible counterterror operations can be measured.
The first guideline is the "armed attack threshold" test devised by
Arend and Beck."- The second guideline is an attempt to identify
objective factors that can be used to measure the necessity and pro-
portionality of a defensive response. The guidelines should be used in
the order they are presented because they are designed to: (1) deter-
mine whether the terrorist act is an armed attack and (2) measure the
propriety of an armed response.
It is important to note that these guidelines are not an authorita-
tive pronouncement on when a state may respond to terrorism with
force. Rather, the guidelines should serve as a method of assisting the
reader through the various factors that must be assessed in determin-
ing the legality of armed responses to terrorism.
The proposed guidelines are:
1) A state must determine whether a given terrorist attack
against its citizens is an armed attack that would justify a
forcible response.1 6 This involves taking three factors
into account:
a) the locus of the attack,
b) the temporal duration, and
c) the severity of harm to the state.17
114. Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 216.
115. I.
116. Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 216.
117. 1
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2) A state must determine if its proposed counterterror op-
eration is necessary and proportionate self-defense. The
state should take three additional factors into account:
a) the number of attacks by the responsible group,
b) the likelihood that such attacks will continue absent
some defensive action,ln s and
c) the level of state support for the terrorists in the coun-
try where the response will take place.
The first guideline is from Beck and Arend's armed attack thresh-
old proposal for measuring when terrorist acts become armed attacks
justifying forcible self-defense." 9 The first factor in this guideline is
the "locus" requirement that postulates that a terrorist attack is more
likely to rise to the level of an armed attack when it takes place within
a state's borders. 120 As with the other factors in these guidelines, this
factor alone should not be determinative of the issue.12' As has previ-
ously been noted, a state may have a right to defend itself when its
citizens are threatened by terrorists abroad.'
The second factor in the first guideline is the "'temporal" element.
This should be thought of in two contexts: the number of terrorist
attacks that have been committed by a particular group against the
responding state and the length of time between the attack and the
resulting counterterror response. 12 The more often the terrorist
group has committed violent acts against a state, the more likely a
particular act will be considered an armed attack. Similarly, the closer
in time that the state's response is taken to the terrorist act, the more
likely such action will be seen as self-defense instead of an illegal
reprisal.1
24
Further, an important factor in determining whether there has
been an armed attack is the "severity of injury" to the state. The more
devastating a particular terrorist act is to a state, either due to the
tactics used by the terrorists or the number of its citizens that are
threatened or harmed, the greater the justification will be for an
armed response.Y'5 Moreover, the greater the injury inflicted by the
118. Baker, supra note 70, at 47.
119. Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 216.
120. Id at 216-17.
121. Id at 216.
122. See id at 199.
123. Id at 217; Baker, supra note 70, at 34.
124. See Baker, supra note 70, at 34.
125. See Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 217.
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terrorists to the responding state, the more likely the response will be
seen as proportionate under the second guideline.
The first two factors to be considered under the second guideline
are taken from Baker's article, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of
Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Char-
ter).126 Both factors involve the severity of the injury inflicted on the
responding state. Specifically, the greater the number of preceding
attacks or the likelihood that such attacks will continue in the future,
the more likely that an armed response will be seen as proportionate
self-defense. 27
Finally, the level of support or toleration for terrorists by the
state is an important factor in assessing the necessity and proportion-
ality of the response. As Beck and Arend point out:
[I]f it were proven that a state provided munitions and logistical
support to terrorist actors, and that those terrorists employed that
assistance in an action reaching the armed attack threshold, then the
sponsoring or supporting state should be considered itself to have
effectively committed an armed attack. Under such circumstances,
the victim state could use force in self-defense against the terrorist-
linked state.1
28
The greater the level of state support for transnational terrorists, the
greater the justification should be for forcible self-defense.
It is hoped that these guidelines and the factors which comprise
them will provide an analytical framework for studying forcible state
responses to terrorism. In the next section, five counterterror opera-
tions, three by Israel and two by the United States, will be tested
under these guidelines to gauge the propriety of the actions under the
self-defense justification in international law.
IV. Testing Israeli and U.S. Counterterror Operations Under
the Proposed Guidelines
A. Critique of Israeli Counterterror Operations
1. The Entebbe Raid
On June 27, 1976, Air France Flight 139, originating in Tel Aviv,
was hijacked by international terrorists after takeoff from Athens en
126. Baker, supra note 70, at 25.
127. ld. at 47.
128. Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 219.
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route to Paris.129 The aircraft with 256 passengers on board was
forced by the terrorists to fly to an airfield at Entebbe, Uganda.'-' On
June 30 and July 1, 147 passengers were released, but the terrorists
continued to hold more than one hundred Israeli and Jewish passen-
gers hostage.131 The terrorists, supported by Idi Amin and the
Ugandan government,132 threatened to kill the hostages unless Israel
and four other countries released fifty-three Palestinian prisoners.' 3
On July 4, 1976, a few hours before the deadline the terrorists had
set was to lapse, Israeli commandos stormed the terminal in which the
hostages were being held.'- In the thirty-five minute operation that
followed, all seven terrorists and twenty Ugandan soldiers guarding
the hostages were killed. 35 In addition, three Israeli hostages and one
Israeli commando were killed in the raid.'?6 In all, one hundred hos-
tages were freed and returned to Israel.i3 7
Under the first forcible self-defense guideline, it must be deter-
mined whether the hijacking amounted to an armed attack against
Israel. Under the locus factor, this hijacking took place outside of
Israel's borders, tending to weaken the argument for finding an armed
attack. However, there is evidence that the terrorists were members
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.), which
had engaged in a series of terrorist attacks against Israelis before the
hijacking took place.13s Moreover, the level of potential harm to
Israel was great, as more than one hundred of its citizens were taken
hostage and threatened with execution. Therefore, taking all of these
factors into account, this hijacking was serious enough to be labeled
an armed attack, justifying a forcible response.
In accordance with the second guideline for necessity and propor-
tionality, a strong argument can be made that the Israeli raid met
these requirements as well. Under the "number of preceding attacks"
factor, this particular terrorist group had struck at Israel several times
in the past. Moreover, under the "likelihood of future harm" factor,
129. John H. Knibb Jr., Entebbe Rescue a Greater Feat, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER
STAR, Jan. 12, 1995, at A10.
130. Id.
131. Id
132. See O'Brien, supra note 5, at 443.






138. See O'Brien, supra note 5, at 443.
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the lives of more than one hundred hostages were hanging in the bal-
ance. If a response were not taken and the terrorists' demands were
not met, all of these people could have been executed. Finally, under
the "state culpability" factor, Idi Amin financed these terrorists, al-
lowed them to land in his country, and provided soldiers to help guard
the hostages.139 Therefore, the response can be seen as both neces-
sary and proportionate to the armed attack on Israeli citizens. The
Entebbe raid should be seen as a permissible use of forcible self-
defense.
2. The 1985 Raid on Tunisia
On Yom Kippur 1985 three Israeli citizens were killed by ter-
rorists on a yacht in the port of Larnaca, Cyprus. 140 Israeli intelli-
gence was convinced that the attack was carried out by Force 17, a
commando unit from the Fatah branch of the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization (PLO).1 4 1 This was the latest of a series of PLO terrorist
attacks against Israel, and it was one that particularly angered Israelis
because it occurred on a religious holiday.
142
On October 1, 1985, a week after the attack at Larnaca, Israel
launched an air raid on the PLO Headquarters at Hammam al-Shatt,
twelve miles south of the Tunisian capital of Tunis. 143 The PLO Head-
quarters, located in Tunisia, were more than 1500 miles away from
Israel.144 Eight Israeli F-16s took off from bases in Israel, refueled in
midair during the long crossing of the Mediterranean, and swooped
down on the PLO Headquarters, completely destroying it.' 45 More
than one hundred people were injured and at least sixty Palestinians
and Tunisians were killed in the attack.'46 The Security Council voted
fourteen to zero to condemn the raid, With the United States ab-
staining from voting.
14 7
In looking at this raid under the first guideline, the killings at
Larnaca may not have reached the armed attack threshold. First, the
Israeli citizens were harmed outside of Israel's borders. Second,
139. See Liden, supra note 133, at 7.
140. William E. Smith, Israel's 1,500-Mile Raid: a Long-Distance Air Attack on the







147. See Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 183.
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although there was some evidence that the attack in Larnaca was part
of a larger pattern of terrorist acts, the PLO denied any responsibility
for the murders, 14 and they could have been the responsibility of any
number of terrorist groups. Finally, while three of its citizens were
murdered, the level of harm to Israel was low because there was no
imminent threat of future harm as was the case at Entebbe. Thus, the
killings at Larnaca, while reprehensible, probably did not meet the
armed attack threshold.
Similarly, under the second guideline, the raid on Tunisia cannot
be defended as a necessary and proportionate defensive response. As
noted above, the attack may have been an isolated incident that was
not a part of a larger pattern of violence. Further, there was no imme-
diate threat of future harm to Israel. State involvement, while pres-
ent, was minimal as there was no evidence that Tunisia was supporting
PLO terrorism against Israel. Therefore, the response was not neces-
sary and proportionate to the terrorist act that preceded it and was
not justifiable self-defense under international standards.
3. The 1996 Attack on Lebanon
Beginning on April 11, 1996, former Israeli Prime Minister
Shimon Peres launched "Operation Grapes of Wrath" against sus-
pected Hezbollah bases in southern Lebanon.14' This action came in
response to a series of Katyusha rocket attacks by Hezbollah, or
"Party of God," guerrillas against targets in northern Israel. "" While
these attacks caused fear and outrage among the Israeli citizens living
in the target areas, there were no reported casualties resulting from
these attacks. 151
The Israeli response, however, was far more devastating in its ef-
fect. On April 18, 1996, Israel launched an artillery attack against
what it claimed to be Hezbollah positions near a U.N. peacekeeper's
compound."5 At least seventy-five Lebanese civilians, many of whom
had sought refuge in the compound after earlier Israeli countermea-
sures, were killed as the shells landed directly within this U.N. -safe
148. See Smith, supra note 140. at 41.
149. Hope for Mideast Truce; Diplomatic Mores Folo;v' the Deaths of 75 Refttccs tn
Israeli Attack on U.N. Base, S.F. EX A NER, Apr. 19, 1996. at Al.
150. ld.
151. Id
152. At Least 75 Civilians Die as Israel Hits U.N. Camp - Lebanese Refugzes Had
Sought Shelter From Raids on Hezbollah, S.A ANToNIo E~xPREs-NE%.;3, Apr. 19, 196.
available in WESTLAW, SAEN Database.
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zone."15 3 The world reaction was swift and highly critical of the mas-
sacre. President Clinton, while stopping short of criticizing the attack,
immediately called for a cease-fire.
154
In applying the proposed guidelines to this attack, it cannot be
justified as permissible self-defense. Under the first guideline, an ar-
gument can be made that the Katyusha rocket attacks constituted an
armed attack against Israel. Because these attacks were directed at
targets within Israel's borders, the locus factor favors such a finding.
Moreover, there is evidence that Hezbollah was engaged in a system-
atic campaign of terror against Israeli citizens. However, under the
severity of harm factor, the attacks were certainly successful in gener-
ating fear, but did not result in any casualties. The absence of this
final factor notwithstanding, the rocket attacks can still be viewed as
an armed attack. A state should not have to wait until its citizens are
harmed or killed before this initial threshold is met.
However, by almost any standard, the bombing of the U.N. com-
pound cannot be seen as a necessary and proportionate response to
the terrorist attacks. Under the first factor, there is little doubt that
Hezbollah had engaged in a series of previous attacks against Israel.
It is arguable whether these attacks would have continued absent
some defensive response or whether they would have become more
severe. Therefore, the second factor can be seen as favoring a re-
sponse under these circumstances.
Despite the presence of the first two factors in this case, the artil-
lery barrage should not be viewed as a necessary and proportionate
response because of the lack of evidence showing state support for the
terrorists. A central theme of this Note is the notion that there must
be state involvement in the terrorist attack before the responding
state may cross national boundaries to defend itself. The indiscrimi-
nate bombing of civilians, particularly civilians who have taken refuge
in a U.N. safe zone, does not fit within this framework. Without con-
crete evidence of some state support for the terrorists, such action
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B. Critique of United States Counterterror Operations
1. The 1986 Raid on Libya
On April 5, 1986, a bomb exploded at a discotheque in La Belle,
West Berlin.155 The discotheque was a popular nightclub among
American service personnel stationed in GermanyY ' Two U.S.
soldiers were among the dead, and 229 people, including seventy-eight
U.S. nationals, were injured' 7 President Ronald Reagan maintained
that according to United States intelligence, Libyan leader Muammar
Qadhafi was supporting the terrorists responsible for the bombing.Y"'
Qadhafi himself congratulated the terrorists and warned -[w]e shall
escalate the violence against American targets, civilian and non-civil-
ian, throughout the world.'
159
The United States responded by launching "Operation El Do-
rado Canyon" on April 14, 1986.163 American F-111 fighters and
bombers took off from bases in Great Britain and struck at five terror-
ist-linked targets in Tripoli and Benghazi.161 As a result of the attack,
thirty-seven people were killed and ninety-three were injured." 2 The
United States response was supported by Israel and the United King-
dom, but denounced by other world leaders as an illegal reprisal.'"
Under the first guideline, the bombing of the German dis-
cotheque can be said to have amounted to an armed attack on the
United States. Although the bombing did not take place on American
soil, it was a severe injury to the United States, as more than eighty
United States nationals were among the casualties. Moreover, given
Qadhafi's ominous warnings to American citizens, the bombing can
be seen as a larger pattern of state-supported terrorism. In sum, a
strong argument can be made that the discotheque bombing was an
armed attack which justified a forcible defensive response.
The Libyan raid passes the second guideline for necessity and
proportionality but just barely. It is apparent that Libya was actively
supporting terrorist groups that targeted American citizens. Secondly,
it is equally apparent that the bombing was part of a larger terrorist
155. See Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 187.




160. Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 185.
161. See Church, supra note 13, at 16.
162. See Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 185-S6.
163. See O'Brien, supra note 5, at 464-67.
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scheme. Finally, it was likely that such acts would have continued to
take place absent some defensive response. Qadhafi promised that
future attacks on American citizens would occur. Therefore, while it
was unfortunate that there were so many casualties as a result of the
raid, given the level of state support for the terrorists and the larger
pattern of terrorist aggression, the United States response can be seen
as justified.
2. The 1993 Missile Attack on Iraq
On June 25, 1993, the United States sent cruise missiles from a
warship in the Persian Gulf to destroy suspected terrorist targets in
Baghdad.164 The United States justified its actions as necessary self-
defense in response to a plot to assassinate former President George
Bush during a state visit to Kuwait. 165 President Clinton argued that
this assassination plot was "devised by the Iraqi government" and that
the missile strike was directed against the intelligence agencies re-
sponsible for formulating it.166 As a result of the missile strike, several
Iraqi civilians were killed.
Under the guidelines for forcible counterterrorism operations, it
is clear that this attack cannot be defended as permissible self-defense.
A finding of an armed attack is dubious because all of the factors
needed to support such a finding are absent. The assassination plot
did not take place on American soil and was not part of a larger ter-
rorist agenda. Also, there was no actual harm to the United States
other than the indignity of having a former President targeted for as-
sassination. Taking all of these factors into account, the Iraqi plot did
not come close to reaching the armed attack threshold.
While this conclusion makes the necessity and proportionality re-
quirements secondary, it should be noted that the missile strike cannot
be defended under this guideline either. This attack was not part of a
larger pattern of terrorist acts committed by the same group against
American interests. Under the threat of imminent harm factor, there
was no indication that the Iraqi intelligence agency was planning simi-
lar attacks. While there was state support for the foiled car bomb
plot, this factor standing alone does not make the strike necessary and
proportionate. To conclude, the missile strike should be viewed as an
164. Beck & Arend, supra note 7, at 188.
165. Id at 189.
166. Id
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impermissible use of force because it cannot be justified under either
guideline.
Under these proposed guidelines, it is possible to distinguish the
permissible use of force in counterterror operations from the imper-
missible. As these five cases indicate, a number of factors must be
considered in order to determine whether a forcible counterterror op-
eration is a necessary and proportionate response to an armed terror-
ist attack.
V. Conclusion
Transnational terrorism is a problem that is continuing to plague
certain countries in the world because of political, social, and eco-
nomic differences. Terrorists, working in an environment where states
have either supported their actions or "looked the other way," have
managed to use violent tactics against innocent civilians to further
their own political goals.
This problem has been exacerbated by the failure of the interna-
tional community to keep the peace. Faced with these harsh realities,
states have been forced to defend themselves from the scourge of ter-
rorism. Increasingly, these states have had to use forcible counterter-
ror operations as an integral component of self-defense.
Forcible self-defense is an idea that has not enjoyed much sup-
port from the international community. In spite of the reluctance to
recognize this right, an argument can be made that there is justifica-
tion for forcible self-defense under international law. Under Article
51 of the U.N. Charter, a state has a right to defend itself from an
armed attack against its citizens. One of the central themes of this
Note is that there are circumstances when an act of terrorism can be
seen as an armed attack, thereby justifing forcible self-defense.
Under the guidelines for permissible self-defense, set out in Part
II.B., the various factors that must be considered in deciding whether
force may be used are the presence of such factors as: state support,
magnitude of injury caused by the terrorism, locus of the attack, and
past history of terrorist acts. Moreover, the presence or absence of
these factors can be used to determine whether a given counterterror
operation is a necessary and proportionate response.
Forcible state responses to terrorism can be most easily justified,
however, because of the deterrent effect that they serve. As Benjamin
Netanyahu, the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister, notes, "[T]he
terrorist always considers and fears a forcible response from his vic-
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tims. Deterrence works on terrorists just as it does on everyone
else."' 67 Therefore, because of a lack of other alternatives, forcible
counterterror operations should always be considered as necessary
and proportionate responses to transnational terrorism.
167. Baker, supra note 70, at 28, citing Benjamin Netanyahu, Terrorism: How the West
Can Win, in TERRORISM: How THE WEST CAN WIN 211 (1986).
